| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't BUG() on unexpected delayed ref type in run_one_delayed_ref()
There is no need to BUG(), we can just return an error and log an error
message. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do not ASSERT() when the fs flips RO inside btrfs_repair_io_failure()
[BUG]
There is a bug report that when btrfs hits ENOSPC error in a critical
path, btrfs flips RO (this part is expected, although the ENOSPC bug
still needs to be addressed).
The problem is after the RO flip, if there is a read repair pending, we
can hit the ASSERT() inside btrfs_repair_io_failure() like the following:
BTRFS info (device vdc): relocating block group 30408704 flags metadata|raid1
------------[ cut here ]------------
BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
WARNING: fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:3235 at __btrfs_free_extent.isra.0+0x453/0xfd0, CPU#1: btrfs/383844
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS info (device vdc state EA): 2 enospc errors during balance
BTRFS info (device vdc state EA): balance: ended with status: -30
BTRFS error (device vdc state EA): parent transid verify failed on logical 30556160 mirror 2 wanted 8 found 6
BTRFS error (device vdc state EA): bdev /dev/nvme0n1 errs: wr 0, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 10, gen 0
[...]
assertion failed: !(fs_info->sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/bio.c:938
------------[ cut here ]------------
assertion failed: !(fs_info->sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/bio.c:938
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/bio.c:938!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 868 Comm: kworker/u8:13 Tainted: G W N 6.19.0-rc6+ #4788 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [W]=WARN, [N]=TEST
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.17.0-0-gb52ca86e094d-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: btrfs-endio simple_end_io_work
RIP: 0010:btrfs_repair_io_failure.cold+0xb2/0x120
RSP: 0000:ffffc90001d2bcf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8305cf42 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 00000000fffeffff R09: ffffffff837fa988
R10: ffffffff8327a9e0 R11: 6f69747265737361 R12: ffff88813018d310
R13: ffff888168b8a000 R14: ffffc90001d2bd90 R15: ffff88810a169000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8885e752c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
------------[ cut here ]------------
[CAUSE]
The cause of -ENOSPC error during the test case btrfs/124 is still
unknown, although it's known that we still have cases where metadata can
be over-committed but can not be fulfilled correctly, thus if we hit
such ENOSPC error inside a critical path, we have no choice but abort
the current transaction.
This will mark the fs read-only.
The problem is inside the btrfs_repair_io_failure() path that we require
the fs not to be mount read-only. This is normally fine, but if we are
doing a read-repair meanwhile the fs flips RO due to a critical error,
we can enter btrfs_repair_io_failure() with super block set to
read-only, thus triggering the above crash.
[FIX]
Just replace the ASSERT() with a proper return if the fs is already
read-only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip vcn poison irq release on VF
VF doesn't enable VCN poison irq in VCNv2.5. Skip releasing it and avoid
call trace during deinitialization.
[ 71.913601] [drm] clean up the vf2pf work item
[ 71.915088] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 71.915092] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1079 at /tmp/amd.aFkFvSQl/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_irq.c:641 amdgpu_irq_put+0xc6/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 71.915355] Modules linked in: amdgpu(OE-) amddrm_ttm_helper(OE) amdttm(OE) amddrm_buddy(OE) amdxcp(OE) amddrm_exec(OE) amd_sched(OE) amdkcl(OE) drm_suballoc_helper drm_display_helper cec rc_core i2c_algo_bit video wmi binfmt_misc nls_iso8859_1 intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common input_leds joydev serio_raw mac_hid qemu_fw_cfg sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 hid_generic crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul polyval_clmulni polyval_generic ghash_clmulni_intel usbhid 8139too sha256_ssse3 sha1_ssse3 hid psmouse bochs i2c_i801 ahci drm_vram_helper libahci i2c_smbus lpc_ich drm_ttm_helper 8139cp mii ttm aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd
[ 71.915484] CPU: 3 PID: 1079 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G OE 6.8.0-87-generic #88~22.04.1-Ubuntu
[ 71.915489] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL, BIOS 1.16.3-2.el9_5.1 04/01/2014
[ 71.915492] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_irq_put+0xc6/0xe0 [amdgpu]
[ 71.915768] Code: 75 84 b8 ea ff ff ff eb d4 44 89 ea 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 fd fc ff ff 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 5d 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff e9 55 30 3b c7 <0f> 0b eb d4 b8 fe ff ff ff eb a8 e9 b7 3b 8a 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
[ 71.915771] RSP: 0018:ffffcf0800eafa30 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 71.915775] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff891bda4b0668 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915777] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915779] RBP: ffffcf0800eafa50 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915781] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff891bda480000
[ 71.915782] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 71.915792] FS: 000070cff87c4c40(0000) GS:ffff893abfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 71.915795] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 71.915797] CR2: 00005fa13073e478 CR3: 000000010d634006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 71.915800] PKRU: 55555554
[ 71.915802] Call Trace:
[ 71.915805] <TASK>
[ 71.915809] vcn_v2_5_hw_fini+0x19e/0x1e0 [amdgpu] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: renesas: rz-du: mipi_dsi: fix kernel panic when rebooting for some panels
Since commit 56de5e305d4b ("clk: renesas: r9a07g044: Add MSTOP for RZ/G2L")
we may get the following kernel panic, for some panels, when rebooting:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
Call trace:
...
do_serror+0x28/0x68
el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x50
el1h_64_error+0x6c/0x70
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer+0x114/0x458 (P)
mipi_dsi_device_transfer+0x44/0x58
mipi_dsi_dcs_set_display_off_multi+0x9c/0xc4
ili9881c_unprepare+0x38/0x88
drm_panel_unprepare+0xbc/0x108
This happens for panels that need to send MIPI-DSI commands in their
unprepare() callback. Since the MIPI-DSI interface is stopped at that
point, rzg2l_mipi_dsi_host_transfer() triggers the kernel panic.
Fix by moving rzg2l_mipi_dsi_stop() to new callback function
rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable().
With this change we now have the correct power-down/stop sequence:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_disable(): entry
ili9881c-dsi 10850000.dsi.0: ili9881c_unprepare(): entry
rzg2l-mipi-dsi 10850000.dsi: rzg2l_mipi_dsi_atomic_post_disable(): entry
reboot: Restarting system |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when unregistering slave
syzbot is reporting
unregister_netdevice: waiting for netdevsim0 to become free. Usage count = 3
ref_tracker: netdev@ffff88807dcf8618 has 1/2 users at
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4400 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4429 [inline]
inetdev_init+0x201/0x4e0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286
inetdev_event+0x251/0x1610 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1600
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_mtu net/core/dev.c:2318 [inline]
netif_set_mtu_ext+0x5aa/0x800 net/core/dev.c:9886
netif_set_mtu+0xd7/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:9907
dev_set_mtu+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:248
team_port_del+0xb07/0xcb0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1333
team_del_slave drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1936 [inline]
team_device_event+0x207/0x5b0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2929
notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2295 [inline]
__dev_change_net_namespace+0xcb7/0x2050 net/core/dev.c:12592
do_setlink+0x2ce/0x4590 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3060
rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x15a9/0x1be0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7d5/0xbe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958
netlink_rcv_skb+0x232/0x4b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x80f/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344
netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894
problem. Ido Schimmel found steps to reproduce
ip link add name team1 type team
ip link add name dummy1 mtu 1499 master team1 type dummy
ip netns add ns1
ip link set dev dummy1 netns ns1
ip -n ns1 link del dev dummy1
and also found that the same issue was fixed in the bond driver in
commit f51048c3e07b ("bonding: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when
unregistering slave").
Let's do similar thing for the team driver, with commit ad7c7b2172c3 ("net:
hold netdev instance lock during sysfs operations") and commit 303a8487a657
("net: s/__dev_set_mtu/__netif_set_mtu/") also applied. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: qcom: q6asm: drop DSP responses for closed data streams
'Commit a354f030dbce ("ASoC: qcom: q6asm: handle the responses
after closing")' attempted to ignore DSP responses arriving
after a stream had been closed.
However, those responses were still handled, causing lockups.
Fix this by unconditionally dropping all DSP responses associated with
closed data streams. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Fix "scheduling while atomic" in IPsec MAC address query
Fix a "scheduling while atomic" bug in mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs() by
replacing mlx5_query_mac_address() with ether_addr_copy() to get the
local MAC address directly from netdev->dev_addr.
The issue occurs because mlx5_query_mac_address() queries the hardware
which involves mlx5_cmd_exec() that can sleep, but it is called from
the mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event workqueue which runs in atomic context.
The MAC address is already available in netdev->dev_addr, so no need
to query hardware. This avoids the sleeping call and resolves the bug.
Call trace:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u112:2/69344/0x00000200
__schedule+0x7ab/0xa20
schedule+0x1c/0xb0
schedule_timeout+0x6e/0xf0
__wait_for_common+0x91/0x1b0
cmd_exec+0xa85/0xff0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_cmd_exec+0x1f/0x50 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_nic_vport_mac_address+0x7b/0xd0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_mac_address+0x19/0x30 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_init_macs+0xc1/0x720 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_build_accel_xfrm_attrs+0x422/0x670 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_ipsec_handle_event+0x2b9/0x460 [mlx5_core]
process_one_work+0x178/0x2e0
worker_thread+0x2ea/0x430 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Adjust PHY FSM transition to TX_EN-to-PLL_ON for TMDS on DCN35
[Why]
A backport of the change made for DCN401 that addresses an issue where
we turn off the PHY PLL when disabling TMDS output, which causes the
OTG to remain stuck.
The OTG being stuck can lead to a hang in the DCHVM's ability to ACK
invalidations when it thinks the HUBP is still on but it's not receiving
global sync.
The transition to PLL_ON needs to be atomic as there's no guarantee
that the thread isn't pre-empted or is able to complete before the
IOMMU watchdog times out.
[How]
Backport the implementation from dcn401 back to dcn35.
There's a functional difference in when the eDP output is disabled in
dcn401 code so we don't want to utilize it directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: fix 22000 series SMEM parsing
If the firmware were to report three LMACs (which doesn't
exist in hardware) then using "fwrt->smem_cfg.lmac[2]" is
an overrun of the array. Reject such and use IWL_FW_CHECK
instead of WARN_ON in this function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: mixer: oss: Add card disconnect checkpoints
ALSA OSS mixer layer calls the kcontrol ops rather individually, and
pending calls might be not always caught at disconnecting the device.
For avoiding the potential UAF scenarios, add sanity checks of the
card disconnection at each entry point of OSS mixer accesses. The
rwsem is taken just before that check, hence the rest context should
be covered by that properly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix zero size inode with non-zero size after log replay
When logging that an inode exists, as part of logging a new name or
logging new dir entries for a directory, we always set the generation of
the logged inode item to 0. This is to signal during log replay (in
overwrite_item()), that we should not set the i_size since we only logged
that an inode exists, so the i_size of the inode in the subvolume tree
must be preserved (as when we log new names or that an inode exists, we
don't log extents).
This works fine except when we have already logged an inode in full mode
or it's the first time we are logging an inode created in a past
transaction, that inode has a new i_size of 0 and then we log a new name
for the inode (due to a new hardlink or a rename), in which case we log
an i_size of 0 for the inode and a generation of 0, which causes the log
replay code to not update the inode's i_size to 0 (in overwrite_item()).
An example scenario:
mkdir /mnt/dir
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 64K" /mnt/dir/foo
sync
xfs_io -c "truncate 0" -c "fsync" /mnt/dir/foo
ln /mnt/dir/foo /mnt/dir/bar
xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/dir
<power fail>
After log replay the file remains with a size of 64K. This is because when
we first log the inode, when we fsync file foo, we log its current i_size
of 0, and then when we create a hard link we log again the inode in exists
mode (LOG_INODE_EXISTS) but we set a generation of 0 for the inode item we
add to the log tree, so during log replay overwrite_item() sees that the
generation is 0 and i_size is 0 so we skip updating the inode's i_size
from 64K to 0.
Fix this by making sure at fill_inode_item() we always log the real
generation of the inode if it was logged in the current transaction with
the i_size we logged before. Also if an inode created in a previous
transaction is logged in exists mode only, make sure we log the i_size
stored in the inode item located from the commit root, so that if we log
multiple times that the inode exists we get the correct i_size.
A test case for fstests will follow soon. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
srcu: Use irq_work to start GP in tiny SRCU
Tiny SRCU's srcu_gp_start_if_needed() directly calls schedule_work(),
which acquires the workqueue pool->lock.
This causes a lockdep splat when call_srcu() is called with a scheduler
lock held, due to:
call_srcu() [holding pi_lock]
srcu_gp_start_if_needed()
schedule_work() -> pool->lock
workqueue_init() / create_worker() [holding pool->lock]
wake_up_process() -> try_to_wake_up() -> pi_lock
Also add irq_work_sync() to cleanup_srcu_struct() to prevent a
use-after-free if a queued irq_work fires after cleanup begins.
Tested with rcutorture SRCU-T and no lockdep warnings.
[ Thanks to Boqun for similar fix in patch "rcu: Use an intermediate irq_work
to start process_srcu()" ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86-64: rename misleadingly named '__copy_user_nocache()' function
This function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical
reasons.
It claimed to be a non-cached user copy. It is literally _neither_ of
those things. It's a specialty memory copy routine that uses
non-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that
does exception handling for both source and destination accesses.
Also note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts
(whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since
only words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86.
The exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space
accesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal "start user space
access" logic around it.
But typically the user space access would be the source, not the
non-temporal destination. That was the original intention of this,
where the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that
needed non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions
synchronously and deal with them gracefully.
Thus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space
into a non-cached kernel buffer. However, the existing users are a mix
of that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did
this as a performance tweak.
Some of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying
version (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even
caring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal
destination.
Rename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and
change the prototype to be more normal: it doesn't take a user pointer
unless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size
is the full size_t (it still won't actually copy more than 4GB in one
go, but there's also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in
the caller).
Finally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which
mis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface
despite it not actually being a user copy at all. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: set backing store type from query type
bnxt_hwrm_func_backing_store_qcaps_v2() stores resp->type from the
firmware response in ctxm->type and later uses that value to index
fixed backing-store metadata arrays such as ctx_arr[] and
bnxt_bstore_to_trace[].
ctxm->type is fixed by the current backing-store query type and matches
the array index of ctx->ctx_arr. Set ctxm->type from the current loop
variable instead of depending on resp->type.
Also update the loop to advance type from next_valid_type in the for
statement, which keeps the control flow simpler for non-valid and
unchanged entries. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: hci_cmd_sync_queue_once() return -EEXIST if exists
hci_cmd_sync_queue_once() needs to indicate whether a queue item was
added, so caller can know if callbacks are called, so it can avoid
leaking resources.
Change the function to return -EEXIST if queue item already exists.
Modify all callsites to handle that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix incorrect pruning due to atomic fetch precision tracking
When backtrack_insn encounters a BPF_STX instruction with BPF_ATOMIC
and BPF_FETCH, the src register (or r0 for BPF_CMPXCHG) also acts as
a destination, thus receiving the old value from the memory location.
The current backtracking logic does not account for this. It treats
atomic fetch operations the same as regular stores where the src
register is only an input. This leads the backtrack_insn to fail to
propagate precision to the stack location, which is then not marked
as precise!
Later, the verifier's path pruning can incorrectly consider two states
equivalent when they differ in terms of stack state. Meaning, two
branches can be treated as equivalent and thus get pruned when they
should not be seen as such.
Fix it as follows: Extend the BPF_LDX handling in backtrack_insn to
also cover atomic fetch operations via is_atomic_fetch_insn() helper.
When the fetch dst register is being tracked for precision, clear it,
and propagate precision over to the stack slot. For non-stack memory,
the precision walk stops at the atomic instruction, same as regular
BPF_LDX. This covers all fetch variants.
Before:
0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8
2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0
3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0
5: (0f) r3 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2)
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 2: (b7) r2 = 0
6: R2=8 R3=fp8
6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0
7: (95) exit
After:
0: (b7) r1 = 8 ; R1=8
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 ; R1=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=8
2: (b7) r2 = 0 ; R2=0
3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2) ; R2=8 R10=fp0 fp-8=mmmmmmmm
4: (bf) r3 = r10 ; R3=fp0 R10=fp0
5: (0f) r3 += r2
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 4: (bf) r3 = r10
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r2 stack= before 3: (db) r2 = atomic64_fetch_add((u64 *)(r10 -8), r2)
mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 2: (b7) r2 = 0
mark_precise: frame0: regs= stack=-8 before 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b7) r1 = 8
6: R2=8 R3=fp8
6: (b7) r0 = 0 ; R0=0
7: (95) exit |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: move wake reason storage into validated event handlers
hci_store_wake_reason() is called from hci_event_packet() immediately
after stripping the HCI event header but before hci_event_func()
enforces the per-event minimum payload length from hci_ev_table.
This means a short HCI event frame can reach bacpy() before any bounds
check runs.
Rather than duplicating skb parsing and per-event length checks inside
hci_store_wake_reason(), move wake-address storage into the individual
event handlers after their existing event-length validation has
succeeded. Convert hci_store_wake_reason() into a small helper that only
stores an already-validated bdaddr while the caller holds hci_dev_lock().
Use the same helper after hci_event_func() with a NULL address to
preserve the existing unexpected-wake fallback semantics when no
validated event handler records a wake address.
Annotate the helper with __must_hold(&hdev->lock) and add
lockdep_assert_held(&hdev->lock) so future call paths keep the lock
contract explicit.
Call the helper from hci_conn_request_evt(), hci_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_sync_conn_complete_evt(), le_conn_complete_evt(),
hci_le_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_ext_adv_report_evt(),
hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt(), hci_le_pa_sync_established_evt(), and
hci_le_past_received_evt(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ecm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_eem: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_subset: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move
The net_device is allocated during function instance creation and
registered during the bind phase with the gadget device as its sysfs
parent. When the function unbinds, the parent device is destroyed, but
the net_device survives, resulting in dangling sysfs symlinks:
console:/ # ls -l /sys/class/net/usb0
lrwxrwxrwx ... /sys/class/net/usb0 ->
/sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
console:/ # ls -l /sys/devices/platform/.../gadget.0/net/usb0
ls: .../gadget.0/net/usb0: No such file or directory
Use device_move() to reparent the net_device between the gadget device
tree and /sys/devices/virtual across bind and unbind cycles. During the
final unbind, calling device_move(NULL) moves the net_device to the
virtual device tree before the gadget device is destroyed. On rebinding,
device_move() reparents the device back under the new gadget, ensuring
proper sysfs topology and power management ordering.
To maintain compatibility with legacy composite drivers (e.g., multi.c),
the bound flag is used to indicate whether the network device is shared
and pre-registered during the legacy driver's bind phase. |
