| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpu/buddy: bail out of try_harder when alignment cannot be honoured
The try_harder contiguous fallback could return a range whose start
offset did not match the caller's min_block_size. When a candidate's
start is misaligned, realign it: free the misaligned run and reallocate
exactly @size at the next lower min_block_size boundary. This keeps the
returned size unchanged with no surplus to trim, and rejects the request
only when no aligned candidate fits.
v2: align misaligned candidates down to min_block_size instead of
bailing out, for both the RHS and LHS paths (Matthew). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: fix header buffer corruption with header-split and HW-GRO
The DQO RX datapath programs a per-buffer-queue-descriptor
header_buf_addr at post time and reads the split header back at
completion time. Both the post and the read currently index the
header buffer by queue position rather than by the buffer's identity:
- post (gve_rx_post_buffers_dqo): header_buf_addr is computed from
bufq->tail
- read (gve_rx_dqo): the header is read from desc_idx (the completion
queue head index)
This relies on the buffer-queue index and the completion-queue index
being equal for the start of every packet, i.e. on the device consuming
posted buffers and returning completions in the exact same order. That
assumption does not hold once HW-GRO is enabled with multiple
flows: coalesced segments are accepted and completed in an order that
may differ from the order buffers were posted, and segments from
different flows may interleave.
That results in two problems:
1. Wrong header slot on read. Because the read offset is derived from
the completion index (desc_idx) while the device wrote the header to
the address programmed for the buffer's buf_id, the driver can copy
a header belonging to a different packet. This shows up as
throughput drop (about 30% drop and large numbers of TCP
retransmissions) with header-split and HW-GRO both enabled and many
streams.
2. Header buffer reused while still owned by the device. The driver
advances bufq->head by one per completion and re-posts buffers based
on that. Arrival of N RX completions only guarantees that at least N
RX buffer descriptors have been read by the device. It does not
guarantee that the device has relinquished the ownership of all the
buffers corresponding to those N descriptors. With out-of-order
completions (e.g. the completion for a packet copied into buffer N
arrives before the completion for a packet copied into buffer N-1),
the driver can re-post and overwrite a header buffer that the device
is still going to write into, corrupting the header of a packet
whose completion has not yet been processed.
Fix both issues by indexing the header buffer by buf_id on both the post
and read paths. Reading from buf_id's slot is therefore always correct
regardless of completion ordering (fixes problem 1).
Indexing by buf_id also ties each header slot to the lifetime of its
buffer state. A buffer state is only returned to the free/recycle lists
when its own completion (buf_id) is processed, so its header slot can
only be re-posted after the device is done with it. This makes header
slot reuse safe under out-of-order completions (fixes problem 2).
Allocate (gve_rx_alloc_hdr_bufs) and free (gve_rx_free_hdr_bufs) the
header buffers based on num_buf_states to match the buf_id indexing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks
check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset
stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with
(slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE.
The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a
4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the
pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates
bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result
even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization.
Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses
when updating slot_type[]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Fit paired fragment job in the correct CCCB
For geometry jobs with a paired fragment job, at the moment, the
DRM scheduler's prepare_job() callback:
- checks for internal (driver) dependencies for the geometry job;
- calls into pvr_queue_get_paired_frag_job_dep() to check for external
dependencies for the fragment job (the two jobs are submitted together
but the common scheduler code doesn't know about it, so this needs to
be done at this point in time);
- calls into the prepare_job() callback again, but for the fragment job,
to check its internal dependencies as well, passing the fragment job's
drm_sched_job and the geometry job's drm_sched_entity / pvr_queue.
The problem with the last step is that pvr_queue_prepare_job() doesn't
always take the mismatched fragment job and geometry queue into account,
in particular when checking whether there is space for the fragment
command to be submitted, so the code ends up checking for space in the
geometry (i.e. wrong) CCCB.
The rest of the nested prepare_job() callback happens to work fine at
the moment as the other internal dependencies are not relevant for a
paired fragment job.
Move the initialisation of a paired fragment job's done fence and CCCB
fence to pvr_queue_get_paired_frag_job_dep(), inferring the correct
queue from the fragment job itself.
This fixes cases where prepare_job() wrongly assumed that there was
enough space for a paired fragment job in its own CCCB, unblocking
run_job(), which then returned early without writing the full sequence
of commands to the CCCB.
The above lead to kernel warnings such as the following and potentially
job timeouts (depending on waiters on the missing commands):
[ 552.421075] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_cccb.c:178 at pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr], CPU#2: kworker/u16:5/63
[ 552.421230] Modules linked in:
[ 552.421592] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 63 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc2-gc5d053e4dccb #39 PREEMPT
[ 552.421625] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 552.421637] Hardware name: Texas Instruments AM625 SK (DT)
[ 552.421655] Workqueue: powervr-sched drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[ 552.421744] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 552.421766] pc : pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr]
[ 552.421850] lr : pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x57c/0xa74 [powervr]
[ 552.421923] sp : ffff800084c47650
[ 552.421936] x29: ffff800084c47740 x28: 0000000000000df8 x27: ffff800088a77000
[ 552.421979] x26: 0000000000000030 x25: ffff800084c47680 x24: 0000000000001000
[ 552.422017] x23: ffff800084c47820 x22: 1ffff00010988ecc x21: 0000000000000008
[ 552.422055] x20: 0000000000000208 x19: ffff000006ad5a88 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422093] x17: 0000000020020000 x16: 0000000000020000 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422130] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 552.422167] x11: 000000000000f2f2 x10: 00000000f3000000 x9 : 00000000f3f3f3f3
[ 552.422204] x8 : 00000000f2f2f200 x7 : ffff700010988ecc x6 : 0000000000000008
[ 552.422241] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 1ffff0001114ee00 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 552.422278] x2 : 0000000000000007 x1 : 0000000000000fff x0 : 000000000000002f
[ 552.422316] Call trace:
[ 552.422330] pvr_cccb_write_command_with_header+0x2c4/0x330 [powervr] (P)
[ 552.422411] pvr_queue_submit_job_to_cccb+0x57c/0xa74 [powervr]
[ 552.422486] pvr_queue_run_job+0x3a4/0x990 [powervr]
[ 552.422562] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x580/0xd48 [gpu_sched]
[ 552.422623] process_one_work+0x520/0x1288
[ 552.422657] worker_thread+0x3f0/0xb3c
[ 552.422679] kthread+0x334/0x3d8
[ 552.422706] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do not try compression for data reloc inodes
[BUG]
There is a syzbot report that the check inside get_new_location()
triggered:
BTRFS info (device loop0): found 31 extents, stage: move data extents
BTRFS info (device loop0): leaf 8908800 gen 16 total ptrs 28 free space 1676 owner 18446744073709551607
item 0 key (256 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3835 itemsize 160
inode generation 5 transid 0 size 0 nbytes 0
block group 0 mode 40755 links 1 uid 0 gid 0
rdev 0 sequence 0 flags 0x0
atime 1669132761.0
ctime 1669132761.0
mtime 1669132761.0
otime 0.0
item 1 key (256 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 3823 itemsize 12
index 0 name_len 2
item 2 key (258 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 3663 itemsize 160
inode generation 1 transid 16 size 733184 nbytes 106496
block group 0 mode 100600 links 0 uid 0 gid 0
rdev 0 sequence 24 flags 0x18
item 3 key (258 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 3595 itemsize 68
generation 16 type 0
inline extent data size 47 ram_bytes 4096 compression 1
[...]
item 27 key (18446744073709551611 ORPHAN_ITEM 258) itemoff 2376 itemsize 0
BTRFS error (device loop0): unexpected non-zero offset in file extent item for data reloc inode 258 key offset 0 offset 9277520992061368337
------------[ cut here ]------------
btrfs_abort_should_print_stack(__error)
[CAUSE]
The above dump tree shows the first file extent item is inlined, which
should make no sense for data reloc inodes, as such inodes just
represent where the data extents are in the relocation destination chunk.
However the relocation path preallocates space for each block,
then dirties them, cluster by cluster.
It's possible to have a single block at the beginning of the block
group, and no other block in the same cluster.
So relocation will preallocate a file extent for that block and dirty
the first block. Then memory pressure forces the data reloc inode to be
written back, before any other blocks are dirtied/allocated.
Finally commit 3eaf5f082c4c ("btrfs: extract inlined creation into a dedicated
delalloc helper") changed the sequence of delalloc. Before that commit we
always tried NOCOW first, so that dirtied block would be written back into
the preallocated space, and appear as a regular extent.
But with that commit, we always try inline first, and since compression
is forced, we try compressing the first block, and then inline the
compressed data, resulting in the above inlined file extent in the data
reloc tree.
Then the check in get_new_location() will check the file offset, without
checking if the file extent is inlined or not, resulting in the above
failure.
[FIX]
Do not allow compression for data reloc inodes.
Since data reloc inode sizes are always block aligned, as long as we do
not compress, @data_len will always be at least one block, and
that will cause can_cow_file_range_inline() to return false, thus no
inlined extent will be created. |
| There is a local privilege escalation vulnerability recently discovered in the NI-PAL kernel driver. This may allow a local, authenticated user to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects NI-PAL 26.3.1 and prior versions running on Microsoft Windows. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: check offset alignment in binder_get_object()
Commit 6d98eb95b450 ("binder: avoid potential data leakage when copying
txn") introduced changes to how binder objects are copied. In doing so,
it unintentionally removed an offset alignment check done through calls
to binder_alloc_copy_from_buffer() -> check_buffer().
These calls were replaced in binder_get_object() with copy_from_user(),
so now an explicit offset alignment check is needed here. This avoids
later complications when unwinding the objects gets harder.
It is worth noting this check existed prior to commit 7a67a39320df
("binder: add function to copy binder object from buffer"), likely
removed due to redundancy at the time. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 12.3.0, PIL/GdImageFile.py GdImageFile._open() read image dimensions from the GD 2.x header and stored them in self._size without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(), allowing a crafted .gd file to trigger excessive C-heap allocation when loaded. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ethosu: fix IFM region index out-of-bounds in command stream parser
NPU_SET_IFM_REGION extracts the region index with param & 0x7f, giving
a maximum value of 127. However region_size[] and output_region[] in
struct ethosu_validated_cmdstream_info are both sized to
NPU_BASEP_REGION_MAX (8), giving valid indices [0..7].
Every other region assignment in the same switch uses param & 0x7:
NPU_SET_OFM_REGION: st.ofm.region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_IFM2_REGION: st.ifm2.region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_WEIGHT_REGION: st.weight[0].region = param & 0x7;
NPU_SET_SCALE_REGION: st.scale[0].region = param & 0x7;
The 0x7f mask on IFM is inconsistent and appears to be a typo.
feat_matrix_length() and calc_sizes() use the region index directly
as an array subscript into the kzalloc'd info struct:
info->region_size[fm->region] = max(...);
A userspace caller supplying NPU_SET_IFM_REGION with param > 7 causes
a write up to 127*8 = 1016 bytes past the start of region_size[],
corrupting adjacent kernel heap data.
Fix by applying the same & 0x7 mask used by all other region
assignments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: validate qr_numregions in dlm_match_regions()
Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: fix two bugs in dlm_match_regions()".
In dlm_match_regions(), the qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION
network message is used to drive loops over the qr_regions buffer without
sufficient validation. This series fixes two issues:
- Patch 1 adds a bounds check to reject messages where qr_numregions
exceeds O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. The o2net layer only validates message
byte length; it does not constrain field values, so a crafted message
can set qr_numregions up to 255 and trigger out-of-bounds reads past
the 1024-byte qr_regions buffer.
- Patch 2 fixes an off-by-one in the local-vs-remote comparison loop,
which uses '<=' instead of '<', reading one entry past the valid range
even when qr_numregions is within bounds.
This patch (of 2):
The qr_numregions field from a DLM_QUERY_REGION network message is used
directly as loop bounds in dlm_match_regions() without checking against
O2NM_MAX_REGIONS. Since qr_regions is sized for at most O2NM_MAX_REGIONS
(32) entries, a crafted message with qr_numregions > 32 causes
out-of-bounds reads past the qr_regions buffer.
Add a bounds check for qr_numregions before entering the loops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate bg_bits during freefrag scan
[BUG]
A crafted filesystem can trigger an out-of-bounds bitmap walk when
OCFS2_IOC_INFO is issued with OCFS2_INFO_FL_NON_COHERENT.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888031bce000 by task syz.0.636/1435
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbe/0x130 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xd1/0x650 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xfb/0x140 mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:186 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x11c/0x200 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
__kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/shadow.c:31
instrument_atomic_read include/linux/instrumented.h:68 [inline]
_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:141 [inline]
test_bit_le include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:21 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:495 [inline]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_bitmap fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:588 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_freefrag fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:662 [inline]
ocfs2_info_handle_request+0x1c66/0x3370 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:754
ocfs2_info_handle+0x18d/0x2a0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:828
ocfs2_ioctl+0x632/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:913
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_info_freefrag_scan_chain() uses on-disk bg_bits directly as the
bitmap scan limit. The coherent path reads group descriptors through
ocfs2_read_group_descriptor(), which validates the descriptor before
use. The non-coherent path uses ocfs2_read_blocks_sync() instead and
skips that validation, so an impossible bg_bits value can drive the
bitmap walk past the end of the block.
[FIX]
Compute the bitmap capacity from the filesystem format with
ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(), report descriptors whose bg_bits exceeds
that limit, and clamp the scan to the computed capacity. This keeps the
freefrag report going while avoiding reads beyond the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()
iommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via
bus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The
inlined check_device() path computes the device's sbdf, calls
rlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards
verifies devid <= pci_seg->last_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes
rlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI
device whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past
the end of the allocation before the caller's bounds check can run.
This was harmless before commit e874c666b15b ("iommu/amd: Change
rlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()"): the table was a
zeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the
caller's NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is
a tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents,
which check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *,
causing a boot-time GPF.
Seen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS
describes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at
00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation,
into the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object:
pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0
pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1
pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2
pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025
RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0
Call Trace:
__iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520
probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50
bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0
iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240
iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60
amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40
pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60
do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0
Guard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied
on 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input vulnerability in Google go-attestation. parseEfiSignatureList() does not advance the buffer past vendor bytes before reading entries. For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, this allows attacker-controlled vendor header bytes to be appended to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log could inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, enabling a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state. This issue affects go-attestation: through 0.6.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: Add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table
The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but
does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past the
syscall function pointer tables. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid for node_mem_{used,free}_bp
Patch series "mm/damon/core: validate damos_quota_goal->nid".
node_mem[cg]_{used,free}_bp DAMOS quota goals receive the node id. The
node id is used for si_meminfo_node() and NODE_DATA() without proper
validation. As a result, privileged users can trigger an out of bounds
memory access using DAMON_SYSFS. Fix the issues.
The issue was originally reported [1] with a fix by another author. The
original author announced [2] that they will stop working including the
fix that was still in the review stage. Hence I'm restarting this.
This patch (of 2):
Users can set damos_quota_goal->nid with arbitrary value for
node_mem_{used,free}_bp. But DAMON core is using those for
si_meminfo_node() without the validation of the value. This can result in
out of bounds memory access. The issue can actually triggered using DAMON
user-space tool (damo), like below.
$ sudo ./damo start --damos_action stat \
--damos_quota_goal node_mem_used_bp 50% -1 \
--damos_quota_interval 1s
$ sudo dmesg
[...]
[ 65.565986] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098
Fix this issue by adding the validation of the given node. If an invalid
node id is given, it returns 0% for used memory ratio, and 100% for free
memory ratio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: Validate SQE128 flag before accessing the cmd
ublk_ctrl_cmd_dump() accesses (header *)sqe->cmd before
IO_URING_F_SQE128 flag check. This could cause out of boundary memory
access.
Move the SQE128 flag check earlier in ublk_ctrl_uring_cmd() to return
-EINVAL immediately if the flag is not set. |
| Dulwich is a pure-Python implementation of the Git file formats and protocols. Starting in version 0.1.0 and prior to version 1.2.5, a client with push access could push a tiny crafted thin pack (~174 bytes) whose delta header declares a huge dest_size. When dulwich ingested it via add_thin_pack / apply_delta, it would allocate hundreds of MB of memory based on that attacker-controlled size, with no relationship to the actual bytes received. Operators running a Dulwich-based Git server that exposes git-receive-pack (i.e. accepts pushes) - for example via dulwich.server functionality, the HTTP smart server, or anything built on ReceivePackHandler - are impacted. The issue is patched in 1.2.5. add_thin_pack now accepts a max_input_size keyword (bytes; 0/None = unlimited, matching git's semantics), and ReceivePackHandler reads receive.maxInputSize from the repository config and passes it through. Wire reads are counted and a PackInputTooLarge exception is raised once the cap is exceeded - equivalent to git index-pack --max-input-size. Users should upgrade to Dulwich 1.2.5 or later and set receive.maxInputSize in their server's repository config to a sane bound for their environment. On unpatched versions, receive.maxInputSize has no effect, so it cannot be used as a workaround. Until upgrading, operators should restrict dulwich-receive-pack (push) access to trusted, authenticated clients only, or disable it entirely on servers that only need to serve fetches and/or run the server under an OS-level memory limit (e.g. ulimit, cgroups/MemoryMax, or a container memory limit) so a malicious push is killed rather than taking down the host. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in fence emission
sdma_v4_0_ring_emit_fence() contains two BUG_ON(addr & 0x3) assertions
that verify fence writeback addresses are dword-aligned. These
assertions can be reached from unprivileged userspace via crafted
DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_CS submissions, causing a fatal kernel panic in a
scheduler worker thread.
Replace both BUG_ON() calls with WARN_ON() to log the condition without
crashing the kernel. A misaligned fence address at this point indicates
a driver bug, but crashing the kernel is never the correct response when
the assertion is reachable from userspace.
The CS IOCTL path is the correct place to filter invalid submissions;
the ring emission callback is too late to do anything about it.
(cherry picked from commit b90250bd933afd1ba94d86d6b13821997b22b18e) |
| Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Codecs in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory write via a crafted video file. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Insufficient data validation in Animation in Google Chrome prior to 149.0.7827.53 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
