| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: ioam: fix heap buffer overflow in __ioam6_fill_trace_data()
On the receive path, __ioam6_fill_trace_data() uses trace->nodelen
to decide how much data to write for each node. It trusts this field
as-is from the incoming packet, with no consistency check against
trace->type (the 24-bit field that tells which data items are
present). A crafted packet can set nodelen=0 while setting type bits
0-21, causing the function to write ~100 bytes past the allocated
region (into skb_shared_info), which corrupts adjacent heap memory
and leads to a kernel panic.
Add a shared helper ioam6_trace_compute_nodelen() in ioam6.c to
derive the expected nodelen from the type field, and use it:
- in ioam6_iptunnel.c (send path, existing validation) to replace
the open-coded computation;
- in exthdrs.c (receive path, ipv6_hop_ioam) to drop packets whose
nodelen is inconsistent with the type field, before any data is
written.
Per RFC 9197, bits 12-21 are each short (4-octet) fields, so they
are included in IOAM6_MASK_SHORT_FIELDS (changed from 0xff100000 to
0xff1ffc00). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix missing key size check for L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ
This adds a check for encryption key size upon receiving
L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ which is required by L2CAP/LE/CFC/BV-15-C which
expects L2CAP_CR_LE_BAD_KEY_SIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: validate MPLS set/set_masked payload length
validate_set() accepted OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS as variable-sized payload for
SET/SET_MASKED actions. In action handling, OVS expects fixed-size
MPLS key data (struct ovs_key_mpls).
Use the already normalized key_len (masked case included) and reject
non-matching MPLS action key sizes.
Reject invalid MPLS action payload lengths early. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: reject oversized addrnr in rt_mt6_check()
Reject rt match rules whose addrnr exceeds IP6T_RT_HOPS.
rt_mt6() expects addrnr to stay within the bounds of rtinfo->addrs[].
Validate addrnr during rule installation so malformed rules are rejected
before the match logic can use an out-of-range value. |
| A Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service via a malformed RSVP packet when RSVP is enabled on the receiving interface. |
| An Improper Validation of Consistency within Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a configured BGP ISO-VPN peer to cause an rpd crash by sending a specific ISO-VPN update which is then processed by BMP route monitoring or NSR. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sysctl: Check range in proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies_minmax
Add the range check to do_proc_int_conv_ms_jiffies_minmax that commit
d174174c6776 ("sysctl: replace SYSCTL_INT_CONV_CUSTOM macro with
functions") incorrectly removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ad4030: fix invalid oversampling_ratio validation
In ad4030_set_avg_frame_len(), the logarithm is calculated before input
validation. Passing zero or negative values leads to an undefined result
from ilog2().
Validate that the input is strictly positive prior to computing its
logarithm. |
| Heap buffer overflow in the HLL sketch deserialization of Apache DataSketches C++ (repo: datasketches-cpp).
When deserializing a sketch in LIST mode, from either a byte buffer or a stream, the coupon count was read from the input and used as the number of entries to copy into a fixed buffer of 8 entries, without checking it against the buffer's capacity. A crafted sketch could cause a write of up to 988 bytes past the end of this internal heap buffer. This can corrupt heap memory, causing a crash and potentially enabling further exploitation.
This issue affects Apache DataSketches C++: from 1.0.0-incubating before 5.3.0. Only applications that deserialize HLL sketches from untrusted sources are affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.3.0, which fixes this issue. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service via a crafted RSVP packet when L2 LSP support is enabled. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a remote unauthenticated BGP peer to cause an rpd crash via a malformed BGP-signaled SRv6 service route when SRv6 dynamic tunnels are enabled. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the
l2ald
of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent attacker with access to an ICCP peer session to cause memory disclosure and disruption of the l2ald daemon via malformed ICCP packets. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a configured BGP EVPN peer to cause an rpd crash via a specifically malformed NLRI. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos Evolved platforms allows a configured EVPN signaling peer to cause an rpd crash via a malformed SRv6 structure carried in an EVPN route update. The result is a denial of service affecting routing adjacencies. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the rpd process of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a configured BGP MVPN peer to cause a denial of service via a BGP MVPN signaling update. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the rpd process of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos Evolved allows an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition via a malformed RIPv2 message. |
| An Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in l2ald of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent attacker to cause a denial of service via an ICCP MC-LAG message. |
| A Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved on PTX Series allows an unauthenticated IS-IS peer to cause a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: validate launch-time metadata size
Launch-time metadata extends beyond the first 16 bytes of struct
xsk_tx_metadata. Reject the request when the registered metadata area does
not contain the complete field.
Snapshot the validated flags for the generic transmit path and use that
snapshot for request and completion processing, avoiding inconsistent
decisions if user space changes the flags concurrently.
Note that only xsk_skb_metadata is properly using the flags,
__xsk_buff_get_metadata ignores them. Next commits address that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ebtables: fix OOB read in compat_mtw_from_user
Luxiao Xu says:
The function compat_mtw_from_user() converts ebtables extensions from
32-bit user structures to kernel native structures. However, it lacks
proper validation of the user-supplied match_size/target_size.
When certain extensions are processed, the kernel-side translation
logic may perform memory accesses based on the extension's expected
size. If the user provides a size smaller than what the extension
requires, it results in an out-of-bounds read as reported by KASAN.
This fix introduces a check to ensure match_size is at least as large
as the extension's required compatsize. This covers matches, watchers,
and targets, while maintaining compatibility with standard targets.
AFAIU this is relevant for matches that need to go though
match->compat_from_user() call. Those that use plain memcpy with the
user-provided size are ok because the caller checks that size vs the
start of the next rule entry offset (which itself is checked vs. total
size copied from userspace).
The ->compat_from_user() callbacks assume they can read compatsize bytes,
so they need this extra check.
Based on an earlier patch from Luxiao Xu. |
